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Abstract
In this paper we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple
sources. This new setting is an extension of the classical model where there is a
single source. We extend several definitions of the folk rule, the most prominent
rule in the classical model, to this new context: first as the Shapley value of the
irreducible game; second as an obligation rule; third as a partition rule; and finally
through a cone-wise decomposition. We prove that all the definitions provide the
same cost allocation and present two axiomatic characterizations.
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1 Introduction
A group of agents is interested in a service provided by a supplier with multiple service
stations, also called sources. Agents will be served through costly connections. They do
not care whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the sources, but they want
to be connected to all of them. This may occur for safety reasons. Agents will have
greater assurances of the service in the sense that they can still enjoy the service even
if one or more sources cease to provide it. There could also be a situation where several
suppliers offer different services by using the same network (Internet, cable TV, etc.)
and agents are interested in all of them. These situations generalize classical minimum
cost spanning tree problems with a single source by allowing the possibility of multiple
sources.
Given a cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources, the least costly way of
connecting all agents to all sources (a minimum cost spanning tree) must be sought.
This tree can be obtained, in polynomial time, by using the same algorithms as in
the classical minimum cost spanning tree problem, for instance that of Prim (1956) or
that of Kruskal (1957). Nevertheless, some variants of this problem are not so easy
from a computational point of view: the fixed cost spanning forest problem studied in
Granot and Granot (1992), where there are potential sites to construct sources at a
fixed construction cost; the multi-source spanning tree problem studied in Farley et al.
(2000), where the objective is to compute the spanning tree that minimizes the sum of
the distances from each source to every other node; and the hop constrained Steiner
trees with multiple root nodes studied in Gouveia et al. (2014).
Once it is known how to connect all the agents to all sources at the minimum cost,
another major issue that usually arises is how to allocate that cost to the agents. Our
paper studies this issue in minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources.
Even though many papers in the literature on Operations Research or Economics study
how to allocate the minimum cost to agents in the classical setting with a single source,
there are only a few devoted to this issue in the setting of multiple sources. Two of
them are mentioned below.
Rosenthal (1987) introduces the minimum cost spanning forest game where there
are multiple sources that offer the same service and agents want to be connected to at
least one source. He associates a cooperative game with this problem and shows that its
core is non-empty. Kuipers (1997) studies a problem where there are multiple sources,
each of them offering a different service, and each agent specifies the set of sources that
she wants to be connected to. He associates a cooperative game with this problem and
seeks to determine the conditions under which the core is non-empty.
Our approach is different because we want all agents to be connected to all sources.
From this perspective our problem can be seen as a particular case of Kuipers (1997)
where all agents demand to be connected to all sources. Nevertheless, the cooperative
game that we set up to study this problem is different. In both the papers mentioned
above the cost of a coalition S is the minimum cost of connecting all members in S to
some sources under the assumption that S is allowed to use nodes outside S. We follow
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the standard approach (as in the classical minimum cost spanning tree problem) and
assume that agents in S can not use the locations of agents outside S.
In classical minimum cost spanning tree problems the most popular rule is the so
called “folk rule”, which is studied in many papers. The folk rule has been proved to
satisfy very appealing properties. It provides allocations in the core and is monotonic
in the population and in the cost matrix. It is also additive in the cost matrix, which
makes it easy to compute. Our first aim is to extend the definition of the folk rule to
our setting by using the following four approaches:
1. as the Shapley value of the irreducible game (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga 2007),
2. as an obligation rule (Tijs et al. 2006; Bergantin˜os and Kar 2010),
3. as a partition rule (Bergantin˜os et al. 2010 and 2011),
4. through a cone-wise decomposition (Branzei et al. 2004; Bergantin˜os and Vidal-
Puga 2009).
We show that all four approaches make the same recommendation: the folk rule.
We also provide two axiomatic characterizations of this rule. In both characterizations
we use five axioms. Four of them are common to both results and the last one is
different. The four common axioms are: independence of irrelevant trees (the cost
allocation should depend only on the arcs that belong to the minimal tree), cone-wise
additivity (the cost allocation should be additive on cones), symmetry (agents with the
same connection costs should pay the same), and equal treatment of source costs (if
the connection cost between two sources increases, all agents should be affected by the
same amount). Independence of irrelevant trees, cone-wise additivity, and symmetry
are defined as in classical minimum cost spanning tree problems. But equal treatment
of source costs, introduced in this paper, is specifically designed for the multiple source
setting since it says nothing in classical minimum cost spanning tree problems. The
other two axioms are core selection (the allocation should belong to the core of the
problem) and separability (two subsets of agents can connect to all sources separately
or jointly, if there are no savings when they connect jointly, agents must pay the same
in both circumstances). Both axioms are also defined as in classical minimum cost
spanning tree problems.
Bergantin˜os and Navarro-Ramos (2019a) prove that the folk rule can also be ob-
tained through a painting procedure in which, following a fixed protocol, agents paint
the arcs on the paths connecting them to the sources. Bergantin˜os and Navarro-Ramos
(2019b) provide another characterization of the folk rule in a paper written after the
present one. They use the properties cone-wise additivity, symmetry, and equal treat-
ment of source costs combined with two other different properties: cost monotonicity
and isolated agents.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2019) also follow the axiomatic approach in our setting.
They characterize several families of rules satisfying some of the following properties:
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cone-wise additivity, independence of irrelevant trees, core selection, and equal treat-
ment of source costs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces minimum cost spanning
tree problems with multiple sources. Section 3 extends the four definitions of the
folk rule to our setting and show that they coincide. Section 4 presents its axiomatic
characterizations. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , |N |} be a set of agents and M = {s1, ..., s|M |} be a set of sources.
We are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of N ∪M . We denote by |N |
and |M | the cardinals of N and M, respectively. For each N and M, a cost matrix
C = (cij)i,j∈N∪M represents the cost of a direct link between any pair of nodes. We
assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ N ∪M and cii = 0 for each i ∈ N ∪M . Since
cij = cji for each i, j ∈ N ∪M, we will work with undirected arcs {i, j}. We denote the
set of all cost matrices over N ∪M as CN∪M . Given C, C ′ ∈ CN∪M , C ≤ C ′ if cij ≤ c
′
ij
for all i, j ∈ N ∪M . Similarly, given x, y ∈ RN , x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for each i ∈ N .
A minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources (a problem for short) is
characterized by a triple (N,M,C) where N is the set of agents, M is the set of sources,
and C is the cost matrix in CN∪M . Given a subset S ⊂ N, we denote by (S,M,C)
the restriction of the problem to the subset of agents S. The classical minimum cost
spanning tree problem (classical problem for short) corresponds to the case where M
has a single element, which is denoted by 0.
For each network g and each pair of distinct nodes i and j ∈ N ∪M, a path from
i to j in g is a sequence of distinct arcs gij = {{is−1, is}}
p
s=1 such that {is−1, is} ∈ g
for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i0, and j = ip. A cycle is a path from i to i. For each
i, j ∈ N ∪M , i and j are connected in g if there is a path from i to j. A tree is a
connected network that has no cycles.
For each network g, S ⊂ N ∪M is a connected component if (1) for each i, j ∈ S,
i and j are connected in g and (2) S is maximal, i.e., for each T ⊂ N ∪ M with
S  T , there are i, j ∈ T , i 6= j, such that i and j are not connected in g. Let
P (g) = {Sk(g)}
n(g)
k=1 be the partition of N ∪M into connected components induced by
g. For each network g, let S(P (g), i) be the element of P (g) to which i belongs. Let
P (N ∪ M) denote the set of all partitions of N ∪ M and P = {S1, . . . , S|P |} be a
generic element of P (N ∪ M). For each P, P ′ ∈ P (N ∪ M), P is said to be finer
than P ′ if for each S ∈ P there is T ∈ P ′ such that S ⊂ T . Given a finite set S,
∆(S) = {x ∈ R such that xi ∈ [0, 1] for each i ∈ S and
∑
i∈S
xi = 1} is the simplex over
S.
For each problem (N,M,C) and each network g, the cost associated with g is defined
as c(N,M,C, g) =
∑
{i,j}∈g
cij. When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g)
instead of c(N,M,C, g). Our first objective is to minimize the cost of connecting all
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agents to the sources. This is achieved by a network of links that has no cycles, which
is called a minimal tree. Formally, a tree t is a minimal tree if c(t) = min{c(g) :
g is a tree}. A minimal tree always exists but it does not necessarily have to be unique.
Kruskal’s algorithm (1956) computes a minimal tree. The idea behind this algorithm
is to construct a minimal tree by sequentially adding the cheapest arc avoiding cycles.
Formally, let A0(C) = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N ∪M and i 6= j} and g0(C) = ∅.
Step 1: Take an arc {i, j} ∈ A0(C) such that cij = min
{k,l}∈A0(C)
{ckl}. If there are
several arcs satisfying this condition, select one of them. Let {i1(C), j1(C)} = {i, j},
A1(C) = A0(C) \ {i, j} and g1(C) = {i1(C), j1(C)}.
Step p + 1 (p = 1, . . . , |N | + |M | − 2): Take an arc {i, j} ∈ Ap(C) such that cij =
min
{k,l}∈Ap(C)
{ckl}. If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select one as before.
Two cases are possible:
1. If gp(C) ∪ {i, j} has a cycle, then go to the beginning of Step p + 1 with Ap(C)
obtained from Ap(C) by deleting {i, j}, that is, Ap(C) = Ap(C)\{i, j}, and gp(C)
the same.
2. If gp(C) ∪ {i, j} has no cycles, then take {ip+1(C), jp+1(C)} = {i, j}, Ap+1(C) =
Ap(C) \ {i, j}, gp+1(C) = gp(C) ∪ {ip+1(C), jp+1(C)}, and go to Step p+ 2.
This process is completed in |N |+ |M | − 1 steps, exactly the minimum number of arcs
that are needed in order to connect all agents with all sources. g|N |+|M |−1(C) is a tree
obtained from the Kruskal algorithm (the algorithm leads to a tree which is not always
unique). When there is no ambiguity, we write Ap, gp, and {ip, jp} instead of Ap(C),
gp(C), and {ip(C), jp(C)} respectively. We denote bym(N,M,C) the cost of a minimal
tree in (N,M,C).
Once a minimal tree is obtained, an interesting issue is how to divide its cost among
the agents. A cost allocation rule, or a rule, is a map f that associates with each
problem (N,M,C) a vector of cost shares f(N,M,C) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C) =
m(N,M,C).
Example 1 Let (N,M,C) be such that N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {a, b}, c1a = 7, c12 = 8,
c3b = 9, c1b = 10, and cij = 20 otherwise. The unique minimal tree is
{{1, a}, {1, 2}, {1, b}, {3, b}} and m(N,M,C) = 34.
3 The folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree prob-
lems with multiple sources
In this section, we extend four definitions of the folk rule to our setting and prove that
they make the same recommendation. The first one is defined as the Shapley value of
the irreducible game, the second is as an obligation rule, the third is as a partition rule,
and the fourth is through a cone-wise decomposition in simple problems.
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3.1 The Shapley value of the irreducible game
In the classical problem, Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007) define the folk rule as the
Shapley value of the irreducible game. We now extend this definition to the case of
multiple sources. Let (N,M,C) be a problem and t a minimal tree in (N,M,C). We
define theminimal network (N,M,Ct) associated with t where ctij = max
{k,ℓ}∈gij
{ckℓ} and gij
denotes the unique path in t from i to j. It is well known that Ct does not depend on the
choice of the minimal tree. Following Bird (1976), the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗)
of (N,M,C) can thus be defined as the minimal network (N,M,Ct) associated with
any minimal tree t. C∗ is referred to as the irreducible matrix.
A game with transferable utility, briefly a game, is a pair (N, v), where v is a real-
valued function defined on all coalitions S ⊆ N satisfying that v(∅) = 0. The irreducible
game is a pair (N, vC∗) such that for each S ⊂ N, vC∗(S) = m(S,M,C
∗), which means
that the value of a coalition is the minimum cost (in C∗) of connecting the agents in S
to every source using only the locations of the members in S.
Let ΠN be the set of all permutations over the finite set N . For each π ∈ ΠN , let
Pre(i, π) be the set of agents of N preceding i in the order π, i.e., Pre(i, π) = {j ∈
N such that π(j) < π(i)}. For each i ∈ N, the Shapley value of a game (N, v) (Shapley
1953) is the average of her marginal contributions:
Shi(N, v) =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈ΠN
(
v(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− v(Pre(i, π))
)
.
Definition 1 For each problem (N,M,C), the rule fSh is defined as the Shapley value
of the irreducible game associated with (N,M,C). Namely, fSh(N,M,C) = Sh(N, vC∗).
We now compute fSh in Example 1. Since the unique minimal tree is
{{1, a}, {1, 2}, {1, b}, {3, b}}, c∗1a = 7, c
∗
12 = 8, c
∗
1b = 10, and c
∗
3b = 9. Besides, c
∗
2a = 8,
and c∗ij = 10 otherwise. The irreducible game is as follows:
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vC∗(S) 17 18 19 25 26 27 34
Thus,
fSh(N,M,C) =
(
62
6
,
68
6
,
74
6
)
= (10.33, 11.33, 12.33).
3.2 Obligation rules
Tijs et al. (2006) define the family of obligation rules for the classical problem. These
rules are defined through obligation functions. Let N0 = N∪{0} be a set of nodes where
0 denotes the source in the classical problem. An obligation function is a map o that
assigns to each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} a vector o(S) meeting the requirements that o(S) ∈ ∆(S)
if 0 /∈ S, oi(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S if 0 ∈ S, and for each S, T ∈ 2
N0 \ {∅} such that
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S ⊂ T and i ∈ S, oi(S) ≥ oi(T ). An obligation function can be interpreted as follows:
Assume that agents in S are connected with one another. Now, they need to construct
an arc from any agent in S to the source so that they are all connected. Thus, oi(S)
represents the proportion of the cost of the arc that each agent i ∈ S must pay. If the
agents in S are already connected to the source, then they do not need to construct
any additional arc and so their obligation is zero, oi(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S.
The obligation rule associated with an obligation function o, which is denoted by
f o, is defined through the Kruskal algorithm as follows. The cost of each arc that is
constructed at each step of the Kruskal algorithm is divided among the agents who
benefit from its construction. Each agent pays the difference between her obligation to
the component to which she belongs before the arc is added and the one afterwards.
Tijs et al. (2006) prove that f o is well-defined, namely, it is independent of the choice of
the minimal tree by the Kruskal algorithm. The folk rule corresponds to the obligation
function where for each S ⊂ N and each i ∈ S, o∗i (S) =
1
|S|
.
We now extend this definition to our setting. Let P =
{
S1, ..., S|P |
}
∈ P (N ∪M).
Note that in the classical problem, if i ∈ Sk, then the obligation of agent i depends only
on Sk (the element of the partition to which i belongs). However, in our problem, it
depends on the whole structure of the partition in connected components. We assume
that for each Sk ∈ P, agents in Sk are connected with one another. The obligation of
each i ∈ N in P, oi(P ), is defined as follows.
(1) A link that joins two components of P with sources: Since all agents in N are
interested in such a link, all agents have an equal obligation over that link.
(2) A link that joins a component Sk without sources (Sk ∩M = ∅) to a component Sk′
with sources (Sk′ ∩M 6= ∅): Since only agents in Sk are interested in such a link, only
agents in Sk have obligations over it.
Formally, for each i ∈ Sk ∩N, the obligation function o
∗ is defined as
o∗i (P ) =


|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
if Sk ∩M 6= ∅,
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
+
1
|Sk|
if Sk ∩M = ∅.
(1)
It is straightforward to see that when there is a single source (|M | = 1), o∗ coincides
with the obligation function associated with the folk rule in the classical problem.
The obligation rule f o
∗
associated with the obligation function o∗ is defined in a
similar way as in the classical problem.
Definition 2 For each problem (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N, the rule f o
∗
is defined as
f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp[o
∗
i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p))].
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In Proposition 1 we prove that f o
∗
is well-defined, namely, for each (N,M,C), f o
∗
divides m(N,M,C) among the agents and is independent of the minimal tree selected
by the Kruskal algorithm.
We now compute f o
∗
in Example 1.
Arc P (g) o∗1(P (g)) o
∗
2(P (g)) o
∗
3(P (g))
∅ {1, 2, 3, a, b}
2− 1
3
+
1
1
= 1 +
1
3
2− 1
3
+
1
1
= 1 +
1
3
2− 1
3
+
1
1
= 1 +
1
3
{1, a} {1a, 2, 3, b}
2− 1
3
=
1
3
2− 1
3
+ 1 = 1 +
1
3
2− 1
3
+ 1 = 1 +
1
3
{1, 2} {12a, 3, b}
2− 1
3
=
1
3
2− 1
3
=
1
3
2− 1
3
+ 1 = 1 +
1
3
{3, b} {12a, 3b}
2− 1
3
=
1
3
2− 1
3
=
1
3
2− 1
3
=
1
3
{1, b} {123ab} 0 0 0
Thus,
f o
∗
1 (N,M,C) = c1a +
1
3
c1b = 7 +
10
3
= 10.33,
f o
∗
2 (N,M,C) = c12 +
1
3
c1b = 8 +
10
3
= 11.33,
f o
∗
3 (N,M,C) = c3b +
1
3
c1b = 9 +
10
3
= 12.33.
3.3 Partition rules
Bergantin˜os et al. (2010, 2011) introduce a family of rules using the Kruskal algorithm.
At each step of the algorithm, the cost of the selected arc is divided among the agents
by using a sharing function. A sharing function ̺ is a map that specifies the part of
the cost paid by each agent at each step of the Kruskal algorithm.
We now explain the sharing function inducing the folk rule in the classical problem.
Assume that when an arc is added, components Sk and Sl are joined. The sharing
function is defined through the following principles.
1. When a component without the source is joined to one with the source, only
agents in the component without the source obtain benefits. Thus, the full cost
of the arc is paid equally by the agents in the component without the source.
2. When two components without the source are joined, agents in both components
benefit. We assume that the total amount paid by one component is proportional
to the number of agents in the other. We further assume that all agents in the
same component pay the same amount.
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For each i ∈ Sk, the proportion of the arc paid by agent i is:
̺i(P, P
′) =


0 if 0 ∈ Sk,
1
|Sk|
if 0 ∈ Sℓ,
|Sℓ|
|Sk ∪ Sℓ||Sk|
if 0 /∈ Sk ∪ Sℓ.
Next we extend the definition of this sharing function to our problem. Let P ={
S1, ..., S|P |
}
∈ P (N ∪M). We assume that for each Sk ∈ P, agents in Sk are connected
to one another. Let P ′ be a partition obtained from P after components Sk and Sℓ are
joined. We define the sharing function ̺ as follows: Cases 1 and 2 are similar to the
ones in the classical problem, but Case 3 is new.
1. When we join a component without sources to one with sources, only agents in
the component without sources benefit. Thus, the full cost of the arc is paid
equally by the agents in the component without sources.
2. When we join two components without sources, agents of both components ben-
efit. We assume that the total amount paid by one component is proportional to
the number of agents in the other. We further assume that all agents in the same
component pay the same amount.
3. When we join two components with sources, all agents in the problem benefit.
Thus, the cost of that arc is divided equally among all agents in the problem.
Formally, for each i ∈ N, the sharing function ̺∗ is defined as
̺∗i (P, P
′) =


1
|N |
if Sk ∩M 6= ∅, Sℓ ∩M 6= ∅,
1
|Sk|
if Sk ⊆ N , Sℓ ∩M 6= ∅, and i ∈ Sk,
|Sℓ|
|Sk ∪ Sℓ||Sk|
if Sk ∪ Sℓ ⊆ N and i ∈ Sk,
0 otherwise.
It is clear that ̺∗(P, P ′) ∈ ∆(N).
Definition 3 For each problem (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N, the rule f ̺
∗
is defined as
f ̺
∗
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp[̺
∗
i (P (g
p−1), P (gp))].
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In Proposition 1 we prove that f ̺
∗
is well-defined, namely, it does not depend on
the choice of the minimal tree by the Kruskal algorithm.
We now compute f ̺
∗
in Example 1.
Arc P (gp−1), P (gp) ̺∗1(P (g
p−1), P (gp)) ̺∗2(P (g
p−1), P (gp)) ̺∗3(P (g
p−1), P (gp))
{1, a} {1, a, 2, 3, b} 1 0 0
{1a, 2, 3, b}
{1, 2} {1a, 2, 3, b} 0 1 0
{12a, 3, b}
{3, b} {12a, 3, b} 0 0 1
{12a, 3b}
{1, b} {12a, 3b}
1
3
1
3
1
3
{123ab}
Thus,
f ̺
∗
1 (N,M,C) = c1a +
1
3
c1b = 7 +
10
3
= 10.33,
f ̺
∗
2 (N,M,C) = c12 +
1
3
c1b = 8 +
10
3
= 11.33,
f ̺
∗
3 (N,M,C) = c3b +
1
3
c1b = 9 +
10
3
= 12.33.
3.4 The cone-wise decomposition
Norde et al. (2004) prove that each classical problem can be written as a non-negative
linear combination of classical simple problems where the costs of the arcs are either
0 or 1. Branzei et al. (2004) define the folk rule first in classical simple problems as
follows. Agents connected to the source through a 0 cost path pay nothing. Agents
connected with one another through a 0 cost path pay the cost of connecting to the
source equally. Then they extend this definition to the general classical problem in a
linear way following the result by Norde et al. (2004).
We first introduce the folk rule in classical simple problems following Branzei et
al. (2004). For each simple problem (N0, C) and each S ⊂ N , two agents i, j ∈ N,
i 6= j, are (C, S)-connected if there exists a path gij from i to j satisfying that for all
{k, ℓ} ∈ gij, ckℓ = 0 and {k, ℓ} ⊂ S. Also, S ⊂ N is a C-component if two conditions
hold: First, for all i, j ∈ S, i and j are (C, S)-connected. Second, S is maximal, i.e., if
S  T, then there exist i, j ∈ T, i 6= j, such that i and j are not (C, T )-connected. It
is obvious that the set of C-components is a partition of N .
For each simple problem (N0, C), the folk rule is defined as follows. For each i ∈ N,
let Si be the C-component to which i belongs. Then,
fi(N0, C) =


1
|Si|
if c0j = 1 for each j ∈ Si,
0 otherwise.
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Namely, agents in a C-component who are connected to the source at 0 cost pay
nothing, whereas agents in a C-component who are connected to the source at 1 cost
divide this cost equally among the members.
Next lemma adapts the results of Norde et al. (2004) to our setting.
Lemma 1 For each problem (N,M,C), there exist a positive number m(C) ∈ N, a se-
quence {Cq}
m(C)
q=1 of cost matrices, and a sequence {x
q}
m(C)
q=1 of non-negative real numbers
satisfying three conditions:
(1) C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq.
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)}, there exists a network gq such that cqij = 1 if
{i, j} ∈ gq and cqij = 0 otherwise.
(3) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)} and each {i, j, k, ℓ} ⊂ N0, if cij ≤ ckℓ, then c
q
ij ≤ c
q
kℓ.
Branzei et al. (2004) extend the definition of the folk rule to a classical problem
(N0, C) using Lemma 1, so that the folk rule is defined as
m(C)∑
q=1
xqf (N0, C
q)
where f (N0, C
q) denotes the folk rule in the simple problem (N0, C
q).
We now apply this approach to our problem. Since we have multiple sources, we
need to adapt the procedure. First, we need to modify the definition of C-component.
Instead of considering each component as a subset ofN, we now consider a C-component
as a subset of N ∪M .
Let (N,M,C) be a simple problem. Denote by P = {S1, . . . , S|P |} the set of C-
components. The rule fCW for simple problems is defined as follows. We first connect
each component without sources to a component with sources and divide the cost
equally among the agents in the component. Then we connect the components with
sources with one another and divide the cost equally among all agents. Formally, for
each i ∈ N, let S(P, i) be the C-component to which i belongs. Then,
fCWi (N,M,C) =


|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
if S(P, i) ∩M 6= ∅,
1
|S(P, i)|
+
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
if S(P, i) ∩M = ∅.
Definition 4 For each problem (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N, the rule fCW is defined as
fCWi (N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqfCWi (N,M,C
q).
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We now compute fCW in Example 1. Note that C =
5∑
q=1
xqCq where x1 = 7,
x2 = x3 = x4 = 1, x5 = 10, and
Arcs C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
{a, 1} 1 0 0 0 0
{1, 2} 1 1 0 0 0
{b, 3} 1 1 1 0 0
{b, 1} 1 1 1 1 0
{a, b} 1 1 1 1 1
{a, 2} 1 1 1 1 1
{a, 3} 1 1 1 1 1
{b, 2} 1 1 1 1 1
{1, 3} 1 1 1 1 1
{2, 3} 1 1 1 1 1
We compute fCW (N,M,Cq) for each q = 1, ..., 5.
1. C1-components are {1, 2, 3, a, b}.
fCW (N,M,C1) =
(
1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
.
2. C2-components are {a1, 2, 3, b}.
fCW (N,M,C2) =
(
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
.
3. C3-components are {a12, 3, b}.
fCW (N,M,C3) =
(
1
3
,
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
.
4. C4-components are {a12, b3}.
fCW (N,M,C4) =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
.
5. C5-components are {ab123}.
fCW (N,M,C5) = (0, 0, 0).
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Then,
fCW (N,M,C) =
5∑
q=1
xqfCW (N,M,Cq)
= 7
(
1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
+
(
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
+
(
1
3
,
1
3
, 1 +
1
3
)
+
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
+ 10 (0, 0, 0)
= (10.33, 11.33, 12.33) .
3.5 Equivalence of the four approaches
In Proposition 1 we prove that the obligation rule f o
∗
and the Kruskal sharing rule
f ̺
∗
are well-defined. In Theorem 1, we prove that all four approaches make the same
recommendation. The proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 f o
∗
and f ̺
∗
are well-defined.
Theorem 1 For each problem (N,M,C),
fSh(N,M,C) = f o
∗
(N,M,C) = f ̺
∗
(N,M,C) = fCW (N,M,C).
4 Axiomatic characterizations of the folk rule
In this section we provide two axiomatic characterizations of the folk rule in the mul-
tiple source setting. We begin with an extension of several axioms discussed in the
classical problem. The first axiom, independence of irrelevant trees, requires that the
cost allocation chosen by a rule should depend only on the arcs that belong to a minimal
tree. This axiom is introduced in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007) and also used in
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) under the name of reductionism.
Independence of irrelevant trees (IIT). For each (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′), if they have
a common minimal tree t such that cij = c
′
ij for each {i, j} ∈ t, then f(N,M,C) =
f(N,M,C ′). Equivalently, IIT can be stated as for each (N,M,C), f(N,M,C) =
f(N,M,C∗), where C∗ is the irreducible matrix associated with (N,M,C).
Cost monotonicity requires that if some cost increases, no agent ends up better off.
This axiom has been widely discussed in the literature: Dutta and Kar (2004); Tijs
et al. (2006); Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007); Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009);
and Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010).
Cost monotonicity (CM). For each (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′), if C ≤ C ′, then f(N,M,C) ≤
f(N,M,C ′). It is easy to check that CM implies IIT.
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Additivity requires that a cost allocation should be additive in the cost matrix, that
is, for each (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′), f(N,M,C + C ′) = f(N,M,C) + f(N,M,C ′).
However, there is no rule satisfying additivity in the classical problem and so there is
no rule satisfying this property in the multiple source setting either. Therefore, as in
the classical problem, we formulate a weaker version of additivity, cone-wise additivity
(Norde et al. 2004; Bergantin˜os and Kar 2010; Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2010) which
requires the additivity property to hold only for a pair of problems where the orders of
all arcs (in increasing cost) coincide for both problems.
Cone-wise additivity (CA). Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be two problems satisfying
that there exists an order σ : {{i, j}}i,j∈N∪M,i<j →
{
1, 2, ..., |N∪M |(|N∪M |+1)
2
}
, such that
for each i, j, k, ℓ ∈ N ∪M satisfying that σ{i, j} ≤ σ{k, ℓ}, then cij ≤ ckℓ and c
′
ij ≤ c
′
kℓ.
Thus, f(N,M,C + C ′) = f(N,M,C) + f(N,M,C ′).
We now introduce a monotonicity property concerned with the changes in the set
of agents. Population monotonicity requires that if new agents join the problem, then
no agent in the initial problem should be worse off. This property has been widely
discussed in the literature: Dutta and Kar (2004); Tijs et al. (2006); Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2007, 2008); Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009); Bergantin˜os and Kar
(2010); and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010).
Population monotonicity (PM). For each (N,M,C), each S ⊂ T ⊆ N , and each i ∈ S,
fi(S,M,C) ≥ fi(T,M,C).
Core selection requires that no coalition of agents has an incentive to deviate from
the grand coalition to build their own minimal tree.
Core selection (CS). For each (N,M,C) and each S ⊂ N ,
∑
i∈S fi(N,M,C) ≤ m(S,M,C).
It is straightforward to show that PM implies CS. For each S ⊂ N and each i ∈ S,
PM implies that fi(N,M,C) ≤ fi(S,M,C), so that
∑
i∈S
fi(N,M,C) ≤
∑
i∈S
fi(S,M,C).
Since
∑
i∈S
fi(S,M,C) = m(S,M,C), PM implies CS.
Suppose that two subsets, S and N \ S, can connect to all sources separately or
jointly. Separability (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga 2007 and 2009; Bergantin˜os et al.
2011) requires that if there are no savings when they connect jointly, the agents must
pay the same in both circumstances.
Separability (SEP). For each (N,M,C) and each S ⊂ N , ifm(N,M,C) = m(S,M,C)+
m(N \ S,M,C), then
fi(N,M,C) =
{
fi(S,M,C) if i ∈ S,
fi(N \ S,M,C) if i ∈ N \ S.
Note that PM also implies SEP. By PM, for each i ∈ S, fi(N,M,C) ≤ fi(S,M,C) and
for each i ∈ N \ S, fi(N,M,C) ≤ fi(N \ S,M,C). If m(N,M,C) = m(S,M,C) +
m(N \ S,M,C), then from the definition of a rule, we have the desired conclusion.
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Symmetry requires that if two agents are symmetric in the sense that they have the
same connection costs to the rest of the agents and the sources, then they should pay
the same.
Symmetry (SYM). For each (N,M,C) and each i, j ∈ N , if cik = cjk for each k ∈
N ∪M \ {i, j}, then fi(N,M,C) = fj(N,M,C).
We now introduce a property specifically designed for our problem, which requires
that if the cost between two sources increases, then all agents should be affected by the
same amount.
Equal treatment of source costs (ETSC). For each (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) and each
a, b ∈ M , if for each k, l ∈ M ∪ N such that {k, l} 6= {a, b}, ckl = c
′
kl, then for each i,
j ∈ N , fi(N,M,C
′)− fi(N,M,C) = fj(N,M,C
′)− fj(N,M,C).
In the classical problem, this axiom is related to constant share of extra costs (Bergantin˜os
and Kar 2010), which requires that if all agents have the same connection cost to the
source and this cost is greater that any other cost in the network, if this cost increases
then agents should share this extra cost in the same way in both problems. However,
constant share of extra costs is concerned with a cost change in the arcs between the
agents and the source, and ETSC is concerned with a cost change in an arc between
two sources.
Next we present the axiomatic characterizations of the folk rule. First, we prove
that the folk rule satisfies all the axioms introduced above.
Proposition 2 The folk rule satisfies IIT, CM, CA, PM, CS, SEP, SYM, and ETSC.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 (a) A rule satisfies IIT, CA, CS, SYM, and ETSC if and only if it is the
folk rule.
(b) A rule satisfies IIT, CA ,SEP, SYM, and ETSC if and only if it is the folk rule.
The proof is in the Appendix. Also, in the Appendix, we show that all the axioms in
Theorem 2 are independent.
We end this section by discussing our characterizations with other results in the
literature.
In the classical problem, Bergantin˜os et al. (2011) characterize the folk rule by
imposing the axioms of CM, CA, CS (or SEP), and SYM. Since CM implies IIT and
the folk rule satisfies CM, the folk rule can alternatively be characterized by imposing
CM instead of IIT. By adding ETSC to the list, we obtain characterizations of the folk
rule in our problem. This axiom is important since we need to specify how a rule should
respond to cost changes between sources differently from the classical problem.
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Bergantin˜os and Navarro-Ramos (2019b) characterize the folk rule with the following
properties: CA, SYM, ETSC, CM and isolated agents (this property is not used in this
paper). This characterization is unrelated with our characterizations in the sense that
there is no implication relationship between the properties. Besides, the proofs of the
characterizations are quite different. See Bergantin˜os and Navarro-Ramos (2019b) for
a more detailed discussion on this issue.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2019) also follow the axiomatic approach. They char-
acterize several families of rules. First they characterize the family of rules satisfying
CA and IIT. They prove that this family can be obtained through Kruskal’s algorithm.
The also characterize the family of rules satisfying the previous two properties and CS.
Finally, they characterize the family of rules satisfying the previous three properties
and ETSC.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We need to prove two statements. First, f o
∗
and f ̺
∗
divide
the cost of the minimal tree m(N,M,C) among the agents. Second, the definition of
f o
∗
and f ̺
∗
does not depend on the choice of the minimal tree by the Kruskal algorithm.
We start with f o
∗
. In order to prove that f o
∗
divides m(N,M,C) among the agents,
it suffices to prove that for each p = 1, . . . , |N |+ |M | − 1, the cost of arc {ip, jp} is
allocated in full among the agents in N .
Given P =
{
S1, ..., S|P |
}
∈ P (N ∪M) it is trivial to see that
∑
i∈N
o∗i (P ) = |P | − 1.
Then, ∑
i∈N
[o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p))] =
∑
i∈N
o∗i (P (g
p−1))−
∑
i∈N
o∗i (P (g
p))
= |P (gp−1)| − 1− (|P (gp)| − 1)
= |P (gp−1)| − |P (gp)|
= 1
Next we prove that f o
∗
does not depend on the choice of the minimal tree by
the Kruskal algorithm. Given a tree t = {{ip, jp}}
|N |+|M |−1
p=1 obtained by the Kruskal
algorithm, we define the following:
• B0(t) = ∅, c0(t) = c0 = 0.
• c1(t) = min
{k,ℓ}∈t\B0(t)
{ckℓ}, c
1 = min
{k,ℓ}⊂N∪M,ckℓ>c0
{ckℓ} , and
B1(t) = {{i, j} ∈ t : cij = c
1(t)}.
• In general, cq(t) = min
{k,ℓ}∈t\∪q−1r=0B
r(t)
{ckℓ}, c
q = min
{k,ℓ}⊂N∪M,ckℓ>cq−1
{ckℓ} , and B
q(t) =
{{i, j} ∈ t : cij = c
q(t)}.
This process ends when we find m(t) ≤ |N |+ |M | − 1 such that ∪m(t)−1r=0 B
r(t)  t =
∪
m(t)
r=0 B
r(t). Note that m(t) denotes the number of arcs in t with different costs.
By the Kruskal algorithm, for all q = 1, ..., m (t), cq(t) = cq. Next, we prove that
P (B1(t)) = P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
1}). Since B1(t) ⊂ {{i, j} : cij ≤ c
1}, P (B1(t)) is finer
than P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
1}). Suppose that P (B1(t)) 6= P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
1}). Then,
there exist S, S ′ ∈ P (B1(t)), S 6= S ′, k ∈ S, and ℓ ∈ S ′ such that ckℓ ≤ c
1. Thus,
B1(t)∪{{k, ℓ}} has no cycles and {k, ℓ} /∈ t, which contradicts the construction of t by
the Kruskal algorithm. Then, P (B1(t)) = P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
1}).
Suppose now that for all q < q0,
P (∪qr=0B
r(t)) = P ({{k, ℓ} : ckℓ ≤ c
q}).
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Using arguments similar to those used in the case q = 1, we can prove that
P (∪q0r=0B
r(t)) = P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q0}).
Since t = ∪
m(t)
r=1 B
r(t) and cij = c
r for all {i, j} ∈ Br(t) and all r = 0, . . . , m(t),
f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p))
]
=
m(t)∑
q=1

 |∪qr=0Br(t)|∑
p=|∪q−1r=0B
r(t)|+1
cipjp
[
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p))
]
=
m(t)∑
q=1
cq
[
o∗i (P (g
|∪q−1r=0B
r(t)|))− o∗i (P (g
|∪qr=0B
r(t)|))
]
=
m(t)∑
q=1
cq
[
o∗i (P (∪
q−1
r=0B
r(t)))− o∗i (P (∪
q
r=0B
r(t)))
]
=
m(t)∑
q=1
cq
[
o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1}))− o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q}))
]
.(2)
Thus, f o
∗
does not depend on the minimal tree t.
To prove that f ̺
∗
is well-defined, it is enough to show that at each step p of the
Kruskal algorithm and for each i ∈ N,
̺∗i (P (g
p−1), P (gp)) = o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)).
Assume without loss of generality that gp = gp−1 ∪ {k, ℓ}, P (gp−1) = {S1, . . . , Sr},
k ∈ S1, ℓ ∈ S2, and P (g
p) = {S ′2, . . . , S
′
r} where S
′
2 = S1 ∪ S2 and S
′
j = Sj for each
j = 3, . . . , r. We consider four cases:
Case 1. S1 ∪ S2 ⊂ N :
Subcase 1.a. i /∈ S ′2. Since S
′
i = Si, it is trivial to see that
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) = 0 = ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Subcase 1.b. i ∈ S ′2. Assume that i ∈ S1 (since the other case is similar, we omit it).
Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
1
|S1|
−
1
|S1 ∪ S2|
=
|S2|
|S1 ∪ S2||S1|
= ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
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Case 2. S1 ∩M 6= ∅ and S2 ∩M 6= ∅:
Subcase 2.a. i /∈ S ′2 and Si ⊂ N .
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
+
1
|Si|
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
1
|S ′i|
=
1
|N |
= ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Subcase 2.b. i /∈ S ′2 and Si ∩M 6= ∅.
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
=
1
|N |
= ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Subcase 2.c. i ∈ S ′2. Suppose that i ∈ S1 (since the other case is analogous, we omit
it). Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
=
1
|N |
= ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Case 3. S1 ⊂ N and S2 ∩M 6= ∅ (since the case S1 ∩M 6= ∅ and S2 ⊂ N is similar, we
omit it):
Subcase 3.a. i /∈ S ′2 and Si ⊂ N . Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
1
|Si|
−
1
|S ′i|
= 0 = ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Subcase 3.b. i /∈ S ′2 and Si ∩M 6= ∅. Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1))− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
= 0 = ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
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Subcase 3.c. i ∈ S ′2 ∩ S1. Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1)− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
+
1
|S1|
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
=
1
|S1|
= ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)).
Subcase 3.d. i ∈ S ′2 ∩ S2. Then,
o∗i (P (g
p−1)− o∗i (P (g
p)) =
|{Sj ∈ P (g
p−1) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
|{S ′j ∈ P (g
p) : S ′j ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
= 0 = ̺∗i (P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)). 
Proof of Theorem 1. From the proof of Proposition 1 we have that f o
∗
= f ̺
∗
. We
now prove that fSh = fCW and f ̺
∗
= fCW .
We first prove that fCW and fSh coincide in simple problems. Let (N,M,C) be
a simple problem. Let P = {S1, . . . , S|P |} be the set of C-components. For each i ∈
N ∪M, let S(P, i) be the C-component to which i belongs. Assume that t is a minimal
tree. It is easy to prove that all the elements inside a component are connected at zero
cost in t, while the components connect to one another through arcs of cost 1. Note that
in the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗) we have that c∗ij = 0 when S(P, i) = S(P, j) while
c∗ij = 1 when S(P, i) 6= S(P, j). Thus, the set of C-components and C
∗-components
coincide. Recall that for each i ∈ N,
fCWi (N,M,C) =


|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
if S(P, i) ∩M 6= ∅,
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
+
1
|S(P, i)|
otherwise.
fShi (N,M,C) = Shi(N, vC∗) =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
(vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π))).
We consider two cases:
Case 1. S(P, i)∩M 6= ∅. For each order π ∈ Π, if π(i) = 1, agent i has to pay the cost of
connecting her component to all sources. Thus, vC∗(Pre(i, π)∪{i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)) =
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1. If π(i) > 1, this means that when this agent arrives
22
all the components with sources are already connected. Thus, vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i}) −
vC∗ (Pre(i, π)) = 0. Therefore,
fShi (N,M,C) =
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π
(vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)))
=
1
|N |!
∑
π∈Π:π(i)=1
(|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1)
=
1
|N |!
(|N | − 1)! (|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1)
=
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
= fCWi (N,M,C).
Case 2. S(P, i) ∩M = ∅. For each order π ∈ Π, we compute vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i}) −
vC∗(Pre(i, π)) distinguishing several cases.
Subcase 2.a. Pre(i, π) ∩ S(P, i) 6= ∅. Thus, vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)) = 0.
Subcase 2.b. Pre(i, π) ∩ S(P, i) = ∅ = Pre(i, π). Then π(i) = 1. Thus, vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪
{i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)) = |{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}|.
Subcase 2.c. Pre(i, π) ∩ S(P, i) = ∅ 6= Pre(i, π). In this case, π(i) > 1. Thus,
vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)) = 1.
Let Π∗ = {π ∈ Π : Pre(i, π) ∩ S(P, i) = ∅ and π(i) > 1}. Taking into account the
computations above, we have that
fShi (N,M,C) =
1
|N |
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}|+
1
|N |!
|Π∗|.
Note that
1
|N |!
|Π∗| =
1
|N |!
|N |−|S(P,i)|∑
k=1
(|N | − |S(P, i)|)!
(|N | − |S(P, i)| − k)!
(|N | − k − 1)!.
We consider |S(P, i)| = m+ 1. Then,
1
|N |!
|Π∗| =
|N |−m−1∑
k=1
(|N | −m− 1)!(|N | − k − 1)!
(|N | −m− k − 1)!|N |!
=
(|N | −m− 1)!m!
|N |!
|N |−m−1∑
k=1
(
|N | − k − 1
m
)
.
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Since(
x+ 1
y + 1
)
−
(
x
y + 1
)
=
(x+ 1)!
(y + 1)! (x− y)!
−
x!
(y + 1)! (x− y − 1)!
=
[(x+ 1)− (x− y)] x!
(y + 1)! (x− y)!
=
x!
y! (x− y)!
=
(
x
y
)
we have that
|N |−m−1∑
k=1
(
|N | − k − 1
m
)
=
|N |−m−2∑
k=1
(
|N | − k − 1
m
)
+
(
m
m
)
=
|N |−m−2∑
k=1
[(
|N | − k
m+ 1
)
−
(
|N | − k − 1
m+ 1
)]
+
(
m
m
)
=
(
|N | − 1
m+ 1
)
−
(
m+ 1
m+ 1
)
+
(
m
m
)
=
(
|N | − 1
m+ 1
)
.
Hence,
1
|N |!
|Π∗| =
(|N | −m− 1)!m!
|N |!
(
|N | − 1
m+ 1
)
=
(|N | −m− 1)!m!
|N |!
(|N | − 1)!
(m+ 1)! (|N | −m− 2)!
=
|N | −m− 1
|N |(m+ 1)
=
1
m+ 1
−
1
|N |
=
1
|S(P, i)|
−
1
|N |
.
Therefore,
fShi (N,M,C) =
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}|
|N |
+
1
|S(P, i)|
−
1
|N |
=
|{Sj ∈ P : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
+
1
|S(P, i)|
= fCWi (N,M,C).
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Now we consider a general problem (N,M,C) and i ∈ N . Thus,
fCWi (N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqfCWi (N,M,C
q) =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqShi(N, v(Cq)∗).
Since the Shapley value satisfies additivity on v,
m(C)∑
q=1
xqShi(N, v(Cq)∗) = Shi
(
N, v∑m(C)
q=1 x
q(Cq)∗
)
.
It only remains to prove that C∗ =
m(C)∑
q=1
xq(Cq)∗. Let t be a minimal tree and gij
the unique path in t from i to j. We know that c∗ij = max
{k,ℓ}∈gij
{ckℓ} = ci′j′. By Lemma 1,
we know that the order of the arcs according to its cost is preserved in each Cq. So t
is also a minimal tree for each simple problem Cq. Thus, cq∗ij = max
{k,ℓ}∈gij
{cqkℓ} = c
q
i′j′ and
hence
c∗ij = ci′j′ =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqcqi′j′ =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqcq∗ij .
We now prove that f o
∗
coincides with fCW . Let (N,M,C) be a problem and t,
m(t), and ck (k = 1, ..., m(t)) be as in the proof of Proposition 1 when we proved that
f o
∗
does not depend on the minimal tree chosen by the Kruskal algorithm. By Lemma
1, C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq. Besides, by Norde et al. (2004), we have that c1 = min{cij : cij > 0}
and
c1ij =
{
0 when cij < c
1,
1 when cij ≥ c
1.
In general, for each q = 2, . . . , m(C),
cq = min{cij : cij > c
q−1},
cqij =
{
0 when cij < c
q,
1 when cij ≥ c
q,
and
xq =
{
c1 when q = 1,
cq − cq−1 when q > 1.
For each q = 1, ..., m(C), the set of Cq-components coincides with P ({{i, j} : cij ≤
cq−1}). Obviously, m(t) ≤ m(C) and t is a minimal tree in Cq for each q = 1, ..., m (C).
Besides, for each q > m(t) and each {i, j} ∈ t, cqij = 0. By definition of f
o∗ , for each
i ∈ N and each q = m(t) + 1, ..., m(C), fCWi (N,M,C
q) = 0. Then,
fCW (N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqfCW (N,M,Cq) =
m(t)∑
q=1
xqfCW (N,M,Cq).
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By definition of o∗ and fCW , for each i ∈ N and each q = 1, ..., m(t),
fCWi (N,M,C
q) = o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1})),
where we denote c0 = 0.
Therefore,
fCWi (N,M,C) =
m(t)∑
q=1
xqfCWi (N,M,C
q)
=
m(t)∑
q=1
xqo∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1}))
= c1o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
0}))
+
m(t)∑
q=2
(cq − cq−1)o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1}))
=
m(t)∑
q=1
cq
[
o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1}))− o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q}))
]
+cm(t)o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
m(t)})).
Since P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
m(t)}) = {N ∪M} , for each i ∈ N, o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤
cm(t)})) = 0. Therefore,
fCWi (N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
cq
[
o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q−1}))− o∗i (P ({{i, j} : cij ≤ c
q}))
]
.
By (2), we deduce that fCWi (N,M,C) = f
o∗
i (N,M,C). 
Proof of Proposition 2.
(1) The folk rule satisfies IIT : By Theorem 1 the folk rule can be defined as the Shapley
value of the irreducible game. Thus, the folk rule satisfies IIT.
(2) The folk rule satisfies CM : Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be such that C ≤ C ′. We
will prove that f o
∗
(N,M,C) ≤ f o
∗
(N,M,C ′). It is enough to prove it when there exists
a, b ∈ N ∪M such that cab < c
′
ab and cij = c
′
ij when {i, j} 6= {a, b}.
Suppose that there is a minimal tree t in (N,M,C) such that {a, b} /∈ t. This
means that t is also a minimal tree in the problem (N,M,C ′) with exactly the same
costs. Since the folk rule satisfies IIT, f o
∗
(N,M,C) = f o
∗
(N,M,C ′). Now suppose that
{a, b} ∈ t for each minimal tree t in (N,M,C). Let T be the set of trees in (N,M,C)
that do not contain the arc {a, b} and x = min
t∈T
c(N,M,C, t)−m(N,M,C).
We distinguish several cases:
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Case 1. c′ab − cab ≤ x. Given a minimal tree t in (N,M,C), we have that t is also a
minimal tree in (N,M,C ′). Consider the set
A = {{i, j} ∈ t : cab < cij < c
′
ab}.
We have two subcases:
Subcase 1.a. A = ∅. We can apply the Kruskal algorithm to problems (N,M,C) and
(N,M,C ′) in such a way that we select the arcs of t in the same order. Therefore, for
each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) = (c
′
ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
where P is the partition in connected components before arc {a, b} is selected by the
Kruskal algorithm and P ab is the partition obtained after arc {a, b} is selected. Note
that P ab = P \ {S(P, a), S(P, b)} ∪ (S (P, a) ∪ S(P, b)). Let i ∈ N .
Subcase 1.a.i. S(P, a) ∩M 6= ∅ and S(P, b) ∩M 6= ∅. Then,
(c′ab − cab)(o
∗
i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab))
= (c′ab − cab)
(
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N |
−
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 2
|N |
)
=
c′ab − cab
|N |
≥ 0.
Subcase 1.a.ii. S(P, a) ∩M 6= ∅ and S(P, b) ∩M = ∅. Since the case S(P, a) ∩M = ∅
and S(P, b) ∩M 6= ∅ is similar, we omit it.
(1) If i /∈ S(P, a) ∪ S(P, b), then
(c′ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
= 0.
(2) If i ∈ S(P, a), then
(c′ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
= 0.
(3) If i ∈ S(P, b), then
(c′ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
=
(c′ab − cab)
|S(P, b)|
≥ 0.
Subcase 1.a.iii. S(P, a) ∩M = ∅ and S(P, b) ∩M = ∅.
(1) If i /∈ S(P, a) ∪ S(P, b), then
(c′ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
= 0.
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(2) If i ∈ S(P, a) (since the case i ∈ S(P, b) is similar, we omit it), then
(c′ab − cab)
(
o∗i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab)
)
= (c′ab − cab)
(
1
|S(P, a)|
−
1
|S(P, a) ∪ S(P, b)|
)
≥ 0.
Subcase 1.b. A 6= ∅. When we apply the Kruskal algorithm to problems (N,M,C) and
(N,M,C ′), the arc {a, b} is selected later in (N,M,C ′). Let
c0 = cab and c
0
ij =
{
c0 if {i, j} = {a, b},
cij otherwise.
For each k ≥ 1, let
ck = min{cij : {i, j} ∈ A, cij > c
k−1} and
ckij =
{
ck if {i, j} = {a, b},
cij otherwise.
We apply this procedure until we find r such that crab = max{cij : {i, j} ∈ A}.
By setting Cr+1 = C ′, we have a sequence of problems {(N,M,Ck)}k∈{0,...,r+1} such
that C0 = C and Cr+1 = C ′. Note that t is a minimal tree in each of those problems.
Besides, for each pair of problems (N,M,Ck) and (N,M,Ck+1) we can select the arcs
of t in the same order following the Kruskal algorithm.
Thus, using arguments similar to those used in subcase 1.a, for each k = 0, ..., r and
each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r+1−k)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r−k) ≥ 0.
Then, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
r∑
k=0
[
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r+1−k)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r−k)
]
≥ 0.
Case 2. c′ab − cab > x. Let the problem (N,M,C
′′) be such that c′′ab = cab + x and
c′′ij = cij otherwise. Let t
′ be a minimal tree in (N,M,C ′). Obviously {a, b} /∈ t′ and t′
is also a minimal tree in (N,M,C ′′). Since the folk rule f o
∗
satisfies IIT, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) = f
o∗
i (N,M,C
′′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C).
Since (N,M,C ′′) satisfies the condition of Case 1, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) ≥ 0.
(3) The folk rule satisfies CA: By Theorem 1 the folk rule can be defined as fCW , the
cone-wise decomposition. Thus, it is obvious that it satisfies CA.
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(4) The folk rule satisfies PM : It is enough to show that for each k ∈ N and each
i ∈ N \ {k}, f o
∗
i (N,M,C) ≤ f
o∗
i (N \ {k},M,C). Without loss of generality, let k =
|N | = n.
First, we claim that if cns = α for each s ∈ M , cni = β for each i ∈ N \ {n}, and
β > α > max
i,j∈N∪M\{n}
{cij}, then for each i ∈ N \{n}, f
o∗
i (N,M,C) ≤ f
o∗
i (N \{n},M,C).
Let t = {{ip(N,M,C), jp(N,M,C)}}
|N |+|M |−1
p=1 be a minimal tree chosen by the
Kruskal algorithm. Then, (i) {i|N |+|M |−1(N,M,C), j|N |+|M |−1(N,M,C)} = {n, s} for
some s ∈ M , (ii) {n, s} is the only arc that agent n is linked in the tree t, and (iii)
N \ {n} and M are already connected under g|N |+|M |−2(N,M,C). Also, the subtree
{{ip(N,M,C), jp(N,M,C)}}
|N |+|M |−2
p=1 is a minimal tree in (N \{n},M,C) and for each
p = 1, . . . , |N | + |M | − 2, {ip(N,M,C), jp(N,M,C)} = {ip(N \ {n},M,C), jp(N \
{n},M,C)}. Then, for each i ∈ N \ {n},
f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
]
=
|N |+|M |−2∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
]
where the last equality comes from the fact that for each i ∈ N \ {n},
o∗i
(
P
(
g|N |+|M |−2(N,M,C)
))
= o∗i
(
P
(
g|N |+|M |−1(N,M,C)
))
= 0.
Note that for each p = 1, . . . , |N |+|M |−2, P (gp(N,M,C))\{n} = P (gp(N \ {n},M,C)) ,
for each i ∈ N \ {n}, S (P (gp(N,M,C)) , i) = S (P (gp(N \ {n},M,C)) , i) , and {Sj ∈
P (gp(N,M,C)) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅} = {Sj ∈ P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C)) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}.
Let i ∈ N \ {n}. For each p = 1, . . . , |N |+ |M | − 2, let
qp = |{Sj ∈ P (g
p(N,M,C)) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}| = |{Sj ∈ P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C)) : Sj ∩M 6= ∅}|
and
sp = |S(P (gp(N,M,C)), i)| = |S(P (gp(N \ {n},M,C)), i)|.
We consider several cases:
Case 1. S (P (gp−1(N,M,C)) , i)∩M 6= ∅. Then, S (P (gp(N,M,C)) , i)∩M 6= ∅. Now
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
=
qp−1 − 1
|N |
−
qp − 1
|N |
≤
qp−1 − 1
|N \ {n}|
−
qp − 1
|N \ {n}|
= o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N \ {n},M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C))) .
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Case 2. S (P (gp−1(N,M,C)) , i) ∩M = ∅ and S (P (gp(N,M,C)) , i) ∩M 6= ∅. Now,
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
=
qp−1 − 1
|N |
+
1
sp−1
−
qp − 1
|N |
≤
qp−1 − 1
|N \ {n}|
+
1
sp−1
−
qp − 1
|N \ {n}|
= o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N \ {n},M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C))) .
Case 3. S (P (gp−1(N,M,C)) , i) ∩M = ∅ and S (P (gp(N,M,C)) , i) ∩M = ∅. Now,
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
=
qp−1 − 1
|N |
+
1
sp−1
−
qp − 1
|N |
−
1
sp
≤
qp−1 − 1
|N \ {n}|
+
1
sp−1
−
qp − 1
|N \ {n}|
−
1
sp
= o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N \ {n},M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C))) .
Therefore,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N,M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N,M,C)))
]
≤
|N |+|M |−2∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o∗i
(
P
(
gp−1(N \ {n},M,C)
))
− o∗i (P (g
p(N \ {n},M,C)))
]
= f o
∗
i (N \ {n},M,C), (3)
as desired.
Let α = max
i,j∈N∪M
{cij} + 1 and β = α + 1. Let C
0 ∈ CN∪M be such that c0ns = α for
each s ∈M and c0ij = cij otherwise. For each r = 1, ..., |N | − 1, let C
r ∈ CN∪M be such
that crnr = β and for each {i, j} 6= {n, r} , c
r
ij = c
r−1
ij . Let i ∈ N \ {n}. Since f
o∗ satisfies
CM,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C) ≤ f
o∗
i (N,M,C
0) ≤ f o
∗
i (N,M,C
1) ≤ · · · ≤ f o
∗
i (N,M,C
|N |−1).
Applying (3) to C |N |−1,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
|N |−1) ≤ f o
∗
i (N \ {n},M,C
|N |−1).
Since c
|N |−1
ij = cij for each i, j ∈ N ∪M \ {n},
f o
∗
i (N \ {n},M,C
|N |−1) = f o
∗
i (N \ {n},M,C)
and so f o
∗
satisfies PM.
(5) The folk rule satisfies CS and SEP : Since PM implies CS and SEP, the result holds.
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(6) The folk rule satisfies SYM : By Theorem 1 the folk rule can be obtained as the
Shapley value of the game associated with the irreducible problem. It is trivial to
prove that if two agents are symmetric in the problem (N,M,C), then they will also
be symmetric in the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗) and hence, in the game associated
with the irreducible problem. Since the Shapley value satisfies SYM, the folk rule also
does.
(7) The folk rule satisfies ETSC : Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be two problems sat-
isfying the conditions in the statement of ETSC. Suppose that there is a minimal tree
in (N,M,C) such that {a, b} /∈ t. Thus, t is also a minimal tree in (N,M,C ′) with the
same costs. Since the folk rule satisfies IIT, we have that f o
∗
(N,M,C) = f o
∗
(N,M,C ′).
Assume that {a, b} ∈ t for each minimal tree t in (N,M,C). Let T be the set of all
trees in (N,M,C) that do not contain {a, b}. Let x = min
t∈T
c(N,M,C, t)−m(N,M,C).
We consider several cases.
Case 1. c′ab − cab ≤ x. Note that a minimal tree t in (N,M,C) is also a minimal tree
in (N,M,C ′). Now consider the set A = {{i, j} ∈ t : cab < cij < c
′
ab}. The proof is
divided into two subcases:
Subcase 1.a. A = ∅. We can apply the Kruskal algorithm to (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′)
in such a way that the arcs of t are selected in the same order. Then, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) = (c
′
ab − cab)(o
∗
i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab))
where P is the partition in connected components before arc {a, b} is selected by the
Kruskal algorithm and P ab is the partition obtained after arc {a, b} is selected. Note
that P ab = P \ {S(P, a), S(P, b)}∪ {S(P, a)∪S(P, b)}. By the definition of o∗, for each
i ∈ N,
(c′ab − cab)(o
∗
i (P )− o
∗
i (P
ab))
= (c′ab − cab)
( |{Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1
|N |
−
|{Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅}| − 2
|N |
)
=
c′ab − cab
|N |
.
Subcase 1.b. A 6= ∅. When we apply the Kruskal algorithm to (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′),
the arc {a, b} is selected later in (N,M,C ′) than in (N,M,C). Let
c0 = cab and c
0
ij =
{
c0 if {i, j} = {a, b},
cij otherwise.
For each r ≥ 1, let cr = min{cij : {i, j} ∈ A, cij > c
r−1} and
crij =
{
cr if {i, j} = {a, b},
cij otherwise.
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We apply this procedure until we find r¯ such that cr¯ab = max{cij : {i, j} ∈ A}. By setting
C r¯+1 = C ′, we have a sequence of problems {(N,M,Cr)}r∈{0,...,r¯+1} such that C
0 = C
and C r¯+1 = C ′. Note that t is a minimal tree in each of those problems. In addition,
for each pair of consecutive problems (N,M,Cr) and (N,M,Cr+1), r ∈ {0, ..., r¯}, we
can select the arcs of t in the same order by following the Kruskal algorithm. Therefore,
by using arguments similar to those used in Subcase 1.a,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
r¯∑
r=0
[
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r¯+1−r)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C
r¯−r)
]
=
r¯∑
r=0
cr¯+1−r − cr¯−r
|N |
=
cr¯+1 − c0
|N |
=
c′ab − cab
|N |
.
Case 2. c′ab− cab > x. Let (N,M,C
′′) be such that c′′ab = cab+x and c
′′
ij = cij otherwise.
Let t′ be a minimal tree in (N,M,C ′). Obviously, {a, b} /∈ t′ and t′ is also a minimal
tree in (N,M,C ′′). Since f o
∗
satisfies IIT, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) = f
o∗
i (N,M,C
′′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C).
Since (N,M,C ′′) satisfies the condition of Case 1, for each i ∈ N,
f o
∗
i (N,M,C
′′)− f o
∗
i (N,M,C) =
c′ab − cab
|N |
=
x
|N |
as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 2.
(a) By Proposition 2, the folk rule satisfies the five axioms. Conversely, let f be a
rule satisfying the five axioms. For each partition P = {S1, S2, ..., S|P |} ∈ P (N ∪M),
we define the function o(P ) = f(N,M,CP ) where cPij = 0 if i, j ∈ Sk for some k ∈
{1, ..., |P |} and cPij = 1 otherwise. Note that∑
i∈N
oi(P ) =
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C
P ) = m(N,M,CP ) = |P | − 1.
We claim that f = f o where for each (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N,
f oi (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
oi
(
P (gp−1)
)
− oi
(
P (gp)
)]
.
Since f and f o satisfy CA, by Lemma 1, f(N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
f(N,M, xqCq) and
f o(N,M,C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
f o(N,M, xqCq). Therefore, it is enough to prove that f coincides
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with f o in problems (N,M,C) where there exists a network g such that cij = x if
{i, j} ∈ g and cij = 0 otherwise. Let P (g) = {S1, ..., Sr} be the partition induced by g
over N ∪M .
When we use the Kruskal algorithm in this problem, we first connect the nodes
within the same component with zero cost until step (|N |+ |M |−r). Then, we connect
the nodes from different components with the constant cost x. Thus, for each i ∈ N ,
f oi (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
oi
(
P (gp−1)
)
− oi
(
P (gp)
)]
=
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=|N |+|M |−r+1
x
[
oi
(
P (gp−1)
)
− oi
(
P (gp)
)]
= x
[
oi
(
P (g|N |+|M |−r+1)
)
− oi
(
P (g|N |+|M |−1)
)]
= x
[
fi(N,M,C
P (g|N|+|M|−r+1))− fi(N,M,C
P (g|N|+|M|−1))
]
.
Note that P (g|N |+|M |−r+1) = P (g) and P (g|N |+|M |−1) = N ∪M .
Since cN∪Mij = 0 for each i, j ∈ N ∪ M and f satisfies CA, for each i ∈ N,
fi(N,M,C
N∪M) = 0, which implies that f oi (N,M,C) = xfi(N,M,C
P (g)). Now, con-
sider C ′ such that c′ij =
1
x
cij for each i, j ∈ N ∪M . Note that C
′∗ = CP (g). By IIT,
f(N,M,CP (g)) = f(N,M,C ′). By CA, f o(N,M,C) = xf(N,M,C ′).
Using similar arguments as in Bergantin˜os et al. (2010, p.708), we can prove that
xf(N,M,C ′) = f(N,M, xC ′), which implies that f o(N,M,C) = f(N,M, xC ′). Since
xC ′ = C, we conclude that f = f o, as desired.
It remains to prove that o = o∗. Now, let P = {S1, ..., Sq, ..., S|P |} be a partition such
that Sk ∩M 6= ∅ when k ≤ q and Sk ⊂ N when k > q. Note that |{Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6=
∅}| = q. We introduce a sequence of problems {(N,M,Cr)}r=1,2,...,q where C
1 = CP
and for each r > 1, Cr is obtained from Cr−1 such that cr
ar−1ar
= 0 if ar−1 ∈ Sr−1 ∩M
and ar ∈ Sr ∩M, and c
r
ij = c
r−1
ij otherwise. By ETSC, for each r = 2, . . . , q and each i,
j ∈ N,
fi(N,M,C
r−1)− fi(N,M,C
r) = fj(N,M,C
r−1)− fj(N,M,C
r).
Since∑
i∈N
[
fi(N,M,C
r−1)− fi(N,M,C
r)
]
=
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C
r−1)−
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C
r)
= m(N,M,Cr−1)−m(N,M,Cr)
= 1,
for each i ∈ N,
fi(N,M,C
r−1)− fi(N,M,C
r) =
1
|N |
.
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Therefore, for each i ∈ N,
fi(N,M,C
1)− fi(N,M,C
q) =
q∑
r=2
[
fi(N,M,C
r−1)− fi(N,M,C
r)
]
=
q − 1
|N |
.
Thus,
o(P ) = fi(N,M,C
1) =
q − 1
|N |
+ fi(N,M,C
q). (4)
By CS, for each k = q+1, . . . , |P |,
∑
i∈Sk∩N
fi(N,M,C
q) ≤ m(Sk ∩N,M,C
q) = 1 and
for each i ∈ (∪qk=1Sk)∩N, fi(N,M,C
q) ≤ m({i},M,Cq) = 0. Since
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C
q) =
m(N,M,Cq) = |P | − q, for each k = q + 1, . . . , |P |,
∑
i∈Sk∩N
fi(N,M,C
q) = 1 and for
each i ∈ (∪qk=1Sk) ∩N, fi(N,M,C
q) = 0. By (1) and (4), for each i ∈ (∪qk=1Sk) ∩N,
oi(P ) =
q − 1
|N |
= o∗i (P )
For each k = q + 1, ..., |P | and each i, j ∈ Sk, i and j are symmetric, so that by
SYM, for each i ∈ Sk (k > q), fi(N,M,C
q) = 1
|Sk|
. From (1) and (4), we have that
oi(P ) =
q − 1
|N |
+
1
|Sk|
= o∗i (P ).
(b) By Proposition 2, the folk rule satisfies the five axioms. Conversely, let f be a
rule satisfying the five axioms. From the same argument as in (a), we obtain (4).
Note that m(N,M,Cq) = |P | − q, for each k = q + 1, . . . , |P |, m(Sk,M,C
q) =
1, and for each i ∈ (∪qk=1Sk) ∩ N, m({i},M,C
q) = 0, which together imply that
m(N,M,Cq) =
q∑
k=1
( ∑
i∈Sk∩N
m({i},M,Cq)
)
+
|P |∑
k=q+1
m(Sk,M,C
q). By SEP, for each k =
q + 1, . . . , |P |, fi(N,M,C
q) = fi(Sk,M,C
q), which implies that
∑
i∈Sk∩N
fi(N,M,C
q) =∑
i∈Sk∩N
fi(Sk,M,C
q) = m(Sk,M,C
q) = 1 and for each i ∈ (∪qk=1Sk)∩N, fi(N,M,C
q) =
fi({i},M,C
q) = m({i},M,Cq) = 0. Once again, by using the same argument as in the
proof of (a), we conclude that f coincides with the folk rule. 
Next, we show that all axioms are independent in Theorem 2.
(1) Dropping Independence of irrelevant trees : Let fw be a rule defined for simple
problems. For each simple problem (N,M,C), we consider g = {{i, j} ⊂ N ∪M : cij =
0}. For each i ∈ N, let
wi =
{ 1
|{{i,j}:j∈S(P (g),i) andcij=0}|
if S(P (g), i) 6= {i},
1 otherwise.
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For each i ∈ N, let fw be
fwi (N,M,C) =


|{Sk∈P (g):Sk∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
if S(P (g), i) ∩M 6= ∅,
|{Sk∈P (g):Sk∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
+ wi∑
j∈S(P (g),i)
wj
otherwise.
This rule is extended to general problems using Lemma 1. The rule fw satisfies CA,
CS, SEP, SYM, and ETSC, but not IIT.
(2) Dropping Cone-wise additivity : We first introduce some notion in the classical prob-
lem following Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2015). For each classical problem (N0, C)
and each S ⊂ N, let
δS =


min
j∈N0\{i}
cij if S = {i},
min
i∈S,j∈N0\S
cij − max
{i,j}∈τ(S)
cij if |S| > 1,
where N0 = N ∪ {0} and τ(S) is a minimal tree in (S, CS) connecting all agents in S.
Let Ne(N0, C) be a set of all coalitions S ⊂ N and |S| > 1 such that δS > 0. Let
oˆ = {oˆx}x∈R+ be a parametric family of functions defined as
oˆxi (N) =


1
|N |
if |N | 6= 2,
1
2
if |N | = 2 and x > 1,
max{1
3
,min{ c0i
c01+c02
, 2
3
}} if |N | = 2 and x ≤ 1.
Let C∗ be the irreducible cost matrix of C. For each (C∗, x) and each i ∈ N , let
ei(C
∗, x) =
∫ x
0
oˆti(N)dt.
Now, we define the rule f e such that for each classical problem (N0, C) and each i ∈ N,
f ei (N0, C) = c
∗
0i −
∑
S∈Ne(N0,C),i∈S
(δS − ei((S, C
∗
S), δS)).
Next, we extend this rule to our problem. For all (N,M,C), let t be a minimal tree in
the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗) where all sources are connected among themselves.
Let tM be the restriction of t to M . We now consider the classical problem (N0, C¯)
such that t¯ = {{i, j} ∈ t : i, j ∈ N} ∪ {{0, i} : i ∈ N and {i, j} ∈ t for some j ∈M}. It
is easy to see that t¯ is a tree that connects all agents in N to 0. Let c¯ij = c
∗
ij if i, j ∈ N
and {i, j} ∈ t¯; c¯0i = max{c
∗
kℓ : {k, ℓ} ∈ g
t
iiM
}, where iM is the first source in the unique
path connecting agent i to each source in t; and c¯ij = max{c¯kℓ : {k, ℓ} ∈ g
t¯
ij} if i, j ∈ N
and {i, j} /∈ t. For each problem (N,M,C), let
f e(N,M,C) =
c(tM)
|N |
+ f e(N0, C¯).
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The rule f e satisfies CM (thus, IIT), PM (thus, CS and SEP), SYM and ETSC, but
not CA.
(3) Dropping Core selection or Separability : The egalitarian rule fE , defined as for
each (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N, fEi (N,M,C) =
m(N,M,C)
|N |
, satisfies CA, IIT, SYM, and
ETSC, but not CS or SEP.
(4) Dropping Symmetry : Let o˜ be a function such that for each P ∈ P (N ∪M) and
each i 6= n,
o˜i(P ) =


|{S∈P :S∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
if i ∈ Sk, Sk ∩M = ∅ and n ∈ Sk,
|{S∈P :S∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
+ 1
|Sk|
if i ∈ Sk, Sk ∩M = ∅ and n /∈ Sk,
|{S∈P :S∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
if i ∈ Sk and Sk ∩M 6= ∅,
and
o˜n(P ) =
{
|{S∈P :S∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
+ 1 if n ∈ Sk and Sk ∩M = ∅,
|{S∈P :S∩M 6=∅}|−1
|N |
if n ∈ Sk and Sk ∩M 6= ∅.
Let f o˜ be a rule such that for each (N,M,C) and each i ∈ N ,
f o˜i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
o˜i
(
P (gp−1)
)
− o˜i
(
P (gp)
)]
.
The rule f o˜ satisfies CA, IIT, CS, SEP, and ETSC, but not SYM.
(5) Dropping Equal treatment of source costs : Let P = {S1, ..., Sq, ..., S|P |} be a partition
in P (N ∪M), where Sk ∩M 6= ∅ if k ≤ q and Sk ∩M = ∅ if k > q. Let t be a number
of agents in an element in P containing no source, i.e., t = |{i ∈ N : i ∈ Sk (Sk ∈ P )
and Sk ∩M = ∅}|. Let ǫ be an arbitrarily small number such that ǫ ∈ (0,
1
|N ||M |
). Let
oǫ be a function such that for each P ∈ P (N ∪M) and each i ∈ N, if 0 < t < |N |,
oǫi(P ) =
{
1−ǫ
|N |
(|{S ∈ P : S ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1) + 1
|Sk|
if i ∈ Sk and Sk ∩M = ∅,
|N |−t(1−ǫ)
|N |(|N |−t)
(|{S ∈ P : S ∩M 6= ∅}| − 1) if i ∈ Sk and Sk ∩M 6= ∅,
and if t = 0 or t = |N |, oǫi(P ) = o
∗(P ). Let f o
ǫ
be a rule such that for each (N,M,C)
and each i ∈ N ,
f o
ǫ
i (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp
[
oǫi
(
P (gp−1)
)
− oǫi
(
P (gp)
)]
.
The rule f o
ǫ
satisfies CA, IIT, CS, SEP, and SYM, but not ETSC.
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